All Knowledge in Practice

Trade Isn’t Settled—Inside the Great Supply Chain Reordering

Davin Chor explains how tariffs and geopolitics are driving a policy-led shift away from China, and why global trade is becoming more uncertain.

In this episode of the Knowledge in Practice Podcast, Tuck’s Davin Chor discusses his new working paper, An Anatomy of the Great Reallocation in U.S. Supply Chain Trade. Chor explains how global trade—once seen as a settled issue—has returned to the center of economic and political debate, reshaping how firms think about sourcing, risk, and resilience. Tracing the impact of U.S. tariffs introduced in 2018 and intensified in recent years, he shows how American companies have steadily shifted supply chains away from China, with lasting consequences for consumers and managers alike.

As Chor puts it, “We’ve come full circle in 25 years—China’s share of U.S. imports is now back to where it was when China joined the WTO.”

The conversation explores who has gained from this shift, why it’s better described as selective decoupling rather than deglobalization, and what business leaders should expect as trade uncertainty becomes the new normal.

Research paper discussed: An Anatomy of the Great Reallocation in U.S. Supply Chain Trade
 

Listen Now

Our Guest

Davin Chor is the Michael G. Fisch 1983 Professor at Tuck and a chair in Dartmouth's academic cluster on globalization, which studies the far-reaching repercussions of globalization on world markets, governments, trade, and society. Professor Chor's current research focuses on international trade and political economy.

Transcript

[This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of the Tuck Knowledge in Practice Podcast is the audio record.]

Kirk Kardashian (host): Davin, welcome to Tuck Knowledge and Practice. It's an honor to have you here. Thanks for your time.

Davin Chor: Yeah, thanks for having me.

Kirk Kardashian (host): It's my pleasure. So I'm excited that today we're talking about a new working paper you have called An Anatomy of the Great Reallocation in US Supply Chain Trade. Before maybe 2018, we didn't talk about trade a whole lot in the public consciousness. But today, trade is everywhere. We're talking about it all the time. It's in the news all the time. There's tariffs. There's all kinds of conflict between nations about trade. And um, so let's talk about the context of your paper here, you know, kind of how, how the world went from no one really caring about trade that much to now everyone cares about it.

Davin Chor: Yeah. It's funny that you mention it. Uh, I do remember that, you know, when I first arrived in tech in 2018. And, you know, I teach global economics for managers, and we have a lesson in that course in which we talk about trade policy. Right. You know, it was often a class where it was, uh, I found it harder to get students to be excited. Right. Because we all kind of taught that trade was, you know, a settled issue, what with the WTO and, uh, in place, you know, and free trade agreements in place, you know, and, ho hum, you know, the world of international commerce just keeps running along. Uh, you know, what's a tariff? I mean, you know, that's a word that I think the general public has been introduced to in the last ten years, right. In 2018, I'm not sure the typical man on the street might have understood what a tariff was. Um, and so things have really changed a lot. Uh, it's been in the headlines once again because what we thought was, uh, an age of globalization, you know, is, is now, uh, you know, being challenged in many, many ways. And one of the protagonists in all of this has been, uh, the US, uh, under the first Trump administration, uh, setting things afoot in 2018 to 2019 with a series of, of tariffs.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah, yeah. So the first Trump administration kind of kicked things off with these tariffs in 2018 and 2019. Um, and many of them continued through the Biden administration. That's right. Um, and and then they were kind of compounded and expanded upon and added on to um in 2025. Right, with the so-called Liberation Day. Right. Um, so we've had sort of numerous, uh, I guess, shocks to the economic world. Um, so what are you looking at in this paper as far as, like, uh, how those, how those shocks sort of played out on the, on the global economy.

Davin Chor: Yeah. Let's, you know, roll things in terms of the timeline, roll things back in terms of the timeline. Uh, you know, the Trump the first Trump administration had made rumblings that it was keen to re-examine a lot of trade agreements, that it. Uh, that the US had signed. You know, uh, back in 2017, there were all these rumblings, uh, the first shoe drops, if you will, right, in 2018 to 2019, uh, you know, an escalation of tariffs. And one of the things with the first Trump administration was that it was sort of fairly clear that, you know, a lot of the tariffs were being targeted against China. Uh, in fact, they invoked section 301, uh, which is basically tariffs that, you know, the executive can levy on the grounds of targeting unfair trade practices by a trade partner. And in this case, it made no secret that it was unhappy with, you know, lack of, uh, equitable market access in the Chinese market. Uh, and so, you see, over the course of 2018 to 2019, uh, you know, uh, a series of increases in tariffs, expanding the number of products that, you know, were, were affected, Uh, such that by the end of 2019, uh, you're basically talking about roughly two thirds of, uh, US imports from China, uh, prior to the trade war, two thirds of that value now being affected by, uh, this section 301 tariffs. Um, and so, uh, things move along, right? You know, um, you know, you could have us companies at that point in time, you could say some of them reacted and they shifted their sourcing away from China.

Davin Chor: Uh, others might have taken a little bit more of a wait and see approach to see what might happen under the Biden administration. Uh, but by the middle of Biden's term as president, it's pretty clear that these tariffs are here to stay. Uh, there's just too much of a political cost, if you will, right, to any attempt to roll back these tariffs. Um, and so, um, um, you know, there might if you thought that there was any uncertainty about the future of these tariffs. I think the Biden administration, in a strange, ironic way, sort of clarified that that posture will be there for quite a while. Um, and then now fast forward to the second Trump administration, and there's been an escalation, right? In April 2025 with the Liberation Day tariff announcements. Now, I call them tariff announcements, because at the end of the day, what level those tariffs have been at is always a matter up for bargaining, if you will, uh, between the Trump administration and a lot of these country governments. Um, um, but what seemed clear was that the second Trump administration was going to be protectionist. But I think there was a lot of surprise, right, in terms of how widespread this was.

Davin Chor: So it's not just China that's being targeted. Now. Every trade partner has a minimum 10% tariff rate. And of course there are differences across countries and how severely affected some are. Canada and Mexico have the minimum 10% additional tariff rate. China has what appears to be right now to be about 34%, uh, in terms of the announced tariff rates. Um, and so it's made for a very, very interesting landscape. Uh, and so where we come in with this paper is, uh, really, uh, you know, with my co-author, Laura Alfaro at HBS. Um, we had written an earlier piece in 2023 for the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium that takes place, uh, annually. Uh, you know, it's like this, uh, big convention of, uh, central bankers and private sector actors and research economists, you know, thinking about what even at that point in time, in 2022, 2023, we are already seeing some signs that this was creating a concerted shift, if you will, in the patterns of US supply chain trade. So we coined this term, you know, uh, a great reallocation that seemed to be afoot, uh, where we could see this most immediately was in terms of direct imports from China. China used to comprise 21% of US imports. Uh, in 2017, that was at its peak, uh, but by 2022, five years on, uh, that had come down to 16%. Um, and so in this paper that we were talking about today, uh, it was an opportunity, if you will, to, to update, uh, and see, you know, with the benefit of hindsight, you know, it's been about 7 or 8 years since the onset of the tariff wars, so to speak.

Davin Chor: Um, what's the current state of play? Right. Uh, and even though the Biden administration didn't increase tariffs, they didn't take them away. Uh, this decrease in dependence on China has continued. Uh, so China's, uh, China's share in US imports, uh, by 2024, the final year of the Biden administration's uh, term in office, uh, was 13%, right. So 21% in 2020, 21% in 2017, um, 16% in 2022, 13% in 2024. Wow. Um, the interesting part was what happened after Liberation Day. Um, and so that was an opportunity for us to dive in, sort of the latest data that was available. Interestingly, we see an even sharper drop, if you will, or an acceleration if you will, in the shift away from China, uh, 13% in 2024. Uh, and by July 2025, it's down to 9%. Wow. Uh, and so to give you a little bit of a context, why why that's such a bellwether of a number, if you will. Right. You know, that was the level, uh, at which China's share in US imports stood in 2001, the year in which China joined the WTO. Um, so we've come full circle, if you will. Wow. Right.

Kirk Kardashian (host): That's incredible. Uh, to to think that our, uh, our trade with China is now at the level that it was when I mean, you can almost point to like that sort of the beginning of globalization in some sense.

Davin Chor: You know, it's 25 years. I mean, we've come full circle in 25 years, right? And it was not something I'd ever imagined could possibly happen, but it has. Yeah. Right.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah. So if we're importing so much less from China, we must be importing those same things. More from other places, right. And I think that's one of the things that you look into in this paper. Right.

Davin Chor: Yep. Shares have to sum to one. Right. So if the share from China goes down, the share from the rest of the world would have gone up. Um, but here's the interesting thing, right? Uh, if you look at things in levels. Right. Uh, the level of imports from China, there's a little bit of fluctuation, right? Uh, you know, because we did see a surge in imports from China. You know, you know, during the Covid 19 pandemic when there was a strong demand for goods. Right? But overall, if you look at the post pandemic till now, you know, you can see a slight decrease in the level of US imports from China. So there is some decoupling in that regard. But it's very selective because US imports from the rest of the world have still been growing relatively strongly. Right. And so, you know, you may think we're going into an age of quote unquote, deglobalization. Uh, I would characterize it slightly differently. Uh, we're going into a period of time where it's, you know, very determined decoupling, if you will, policy driven decoupling from China. Uh, but, uh, from the rest of the world, the US is still engaged. Right. The US is not disavowing itself in any sort of practical way from global supply chains as of now. Right. Uh, you know, whether or not, you know, you may hear a lot of talk about reshoring and bringing back manufacturing.

Davin Chor: Uh, we are not seeing that yet. Uh, so to speak. Uh, so it's been selective decoupling. Yeah, it has been moving away from China. And so who's gained. Right. Uh, so Mexico overtook China, uh, in 2023 as the top, uh, import trade partner of the US. Uh, and uh, more recently, in 2025, Canada overtook China. So it's now Mexico. Canada, uh, and then China. Wow. Um, so you hear, you know, Mexico and Canada, it's quite clear why they, you know, they would be, in some sense, the obvious candidates to stand to gain. Right? They have a long standing history of trade with the US, uh, through NAFTA now called the Usmca. Um, uh, they have proximity to the US, right? Um, but at the same time, too, uh, we have also seen, um, other established trade partners, if you will, of the US, um, outside of China, but in the broader East Asian region. So Vietnam stands out, right? It has gained quite a bit, uh, around two percentage points of US import market share and more recently, uh, another trade partner that has gained, uh, if you will, has been Taiwan. Uh, and they're sort of the natural reasons. You know, Taiwan has a strong comparative advantage in advanced semiconductors, uh, and uh, computer and AI related products, uh, that are in strong demand in the US right now.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah, yeah. Wow. It's super interesting. Um, so when you mentioned the difference between levels and share, can, can you give maybe a real world example to help kind of flesh that out a little bit. Is there like a, I mean just so I can understand that it sounds like the level that we're importing from China might not be as reduced as the share of certain imports that we're, that we were using. Is that right or not?

Davin Chor: Um, one of the things that has been touted, right, has been that, you know, this is in some sense necessary if the US is to become less dependent on China for, uh, for a variety of reasons like resilience or national security. Um, so what this means is that there has been diversification, right in the composition of trade partners that the US is getting its imports from. It's now less reliant on China per se and diversified, if you will. You know, and to draw its imports from Mexico, Vietnam and other trade partners. But one of the things that we did find in our paper is that this diversification has a somewhat limited flavor to it, which is that if you look at the top 30 US import trade partners, right, they still account for the lion's share of US imports, like 85%. And that share has stayed stable. So that, you know, all the action is in the top 30 trade partners, if you will. Right. It has not been diversified beyond that. And you've looked at the identity of the trade partners that are in those top 30. They have been very, very stable. There's only been one newcomer in that top 30, right, as of July 2025 compared to 2017. So it's been a reshuffling across established familiar faces, if you will, that the US has already been importing from. So there's sort of a caveat, if you will, to the extent of the diversification.

Kirk Kardashian (host): So if we could talk about some of the implications here of this reshuffling of, of trade. Um, so, I mean, on the face of it, it looks like China is a loser because they're losing a lot of exporting to the United States. Maybe Mexico is a winner. Canada is a winner. Vietnam is a winner. Is that how you see it? Like, who are the winners and losers in this current day and age?

Davin Chor: Um, I would be cautious about using the language of winners and losers because, you know, if we think that this is a long game, we may just be in the first quarter. Okay. Uh, off of a basketball game, if I could use that analogy. And, well, you know, China's trade with the US has dropped. If you look at China's trade with the rest of the world, excluding the US. That still continues to be pretty healthy, right? So there's some evidence that China's been able to find alternative markets for its goods. Uh, you know, its trade with the EU, for example, has continued to grow. So I would be a little bit cautious about, you know, saying that trade with the US is the end all and be all, if anything. Right. You know, the US tariff actions against China have, you know, prompted China to be, you know, to look beyond the US as a market, if you will. Right. And make their economy more resilient or to tariff proof their economy, so to speak. So I would hesitate to use the language of winners and losers in this regard. Um, uh, who I would think are losers in this situation, uh, would be US consumers, right? Um, you know, what used to be accessible, you know, in terms of relatively inexpensive goods from China. Now you know, there are tariffs on those goods, right. Uh, and if you're a company that used to be getting an input, uh, or a good that you used to source from China and that's now more expensive and you've decided to look elsewhere, right. It's very likely that those alternative sources are not, as you know, low cost as China is. Right? So there are trade offs here, uh, in the picture. Right. Just the fact that, you know, us consumers now have lost that option, or that option has now become more expensive, uh, you know, makes, you know, you know, in general, this is not good for the US consumers or global consumers in general, I would say. Yeah.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah.

Davin Chor: Wow. To be in an atmosphere in which countries are playing this tariff game.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah. Yeah. Um, how have you seen companies or managers sort of reacting to this new environment? Um, as far as how they're managing their supply chain.

Davin Chor: Um, that's a great question. Um, so. They're having the benefit of the data since 2017 has given us some interesting insights. Um, so between 2017 and 2020, which is like sort of the immediate short run aftermath of the first round of tariffs. Um, one of the things that we did see is that, you know, us direct imports of some goods from China, like computer parts, uh, like apparel that moved away very quickly. Right. Um, so our interpretation of that was that firms, you know, um, had already been, you know, Chinese companies, for example, they were exporting these goods to the US. Some of them we know even before this predates the tariffs. Uh, we're already looking to alternative locations like Vietnam to offshore some of their operations because labor costs within China were getting more expensive as China was developing. Right. And so there was that capacity, if you will, to switch and pivot quite quickly to alternative sources of apparel and computer parts. Um, you know, so, uh, so you saw, you know, those imports from China drop and, uh, rise in turn, you know, uh, from Vietnam. Um, so, so, so for some goods, you know, companies had that capacity to move quite quickly. Um, there were other goods where the reaction was delayed right between 2021 and 2024 is where you see a lot of the action, right? Uh, for products like laptops.

Davin Chor: Right. You know, there's a dramatic drop in the US share of imports from China in terms of laptops. But all that action is concentrated in 2021 and 2024. It's delayed. Now here's the interesting thing. The section 301 tariffs on laptops, we will actually suspend it, right? So, uh, you know, initially the trumpet first Trump administration was intending to put 25% tariffs on laptops. I believe it was 25% on laptops in September 2019. But then they had a stay of execution and they said they were going to suspend those tariffs. I think it was motivated at that point in time of wanting to spare consumers the sticker shock. With the upcoming holiday shopping season at the end of 2019. But those tariffs have remained indefinitely suspended. So if you go to the USSR's website, they will tell you that. Right. So the tariffs on laptops have been indefinitely suspended. But even though the tariff on the laptop was zero, the additional tariff was zero. Uh, manufacturers and US companies decided to start moving those supply chains out of China. Right. Uh, and, you know, one can speculate what the reasons are. You know, perhaps there's uncertainty, there's fear that these tariffs may actually materialize eventually.

Davin Chor: Um, alternatively, you know, they might have strong incentives to want to move their supply chains if, uh, the parts and components are being subject to the tariffs. We may as well move, you know, the final assembly out of China as well, say, to a third country like Vietnam or Mexico. Yeah, right. Um, and so we start to see much more profound, uh, spillovers, if you will, of these tariffs between 2021 and 2024 to, to, to, to become a little bit more pervasive. So even if the final good itself was not subject to the tariff, the supply chain started moving. I think the timing is not a coincidence because it was really in 2021 to 2024, if you were a manufacturer, uh, or US manufacturing firm in the US, right. Uh, and you were thinking to yourself, you know, let's play the wait and see game and see if things will change under the Biden administration between 2021 and 2024, it becomes pretty clear that these tariffs are going to be here to stay. And so if you're going to move your operations, that's when you start. You start thinking very seriously about activating those plans. Now our interpretation of what happens in 2025. Right. This interpretation also helps us understand a bit what's going on in 2025.

Davin Chor: So when the second Trump administration announces during Liberation Day that it's going to go ahead with high additional tariffs, we will see an acceleration, if you will, right, of um, um, the reallocation away from China. Right. It drops from 13%, uh, 13% Chinese share in US imports down to 9%, all in the space of four months between March 2025 and July 2025. Wow. Right. That's only going to happen if US companies had already been thinking very seriously about the possibility that they might need to do this right. So this is, if you will, the legacy of 6 to 7 years of having to navigate these terrors and think about, uh, alternative plans. Right. Uh, to think about alternative sources of those, uh, goods that you might need from China. Uh, think about putting in place alternative production facilities, searching for, you know, other suppliers in, in, in, in other countries, um, you know, the legacy of the first Trump administration's tariffs has been really to force companies to think through these decisions. And it appears that quite a lot of them were able to act on it. Uh, you know, very, very quickly, uh, in the immediate aftermath of the Liberation Day, uh, announcements.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Wow. Wow. That's super interesting. Uh, that those first tariffs in 2018 kind of put the wheels in motion. Um, I think they sent the message that everything is not okay anymore. And you better start thinking about some alternatives, right?

Davin Chor: Right. So the contingency planning, you know, uh, you know, thinking about, uh, how to make your supply chains, quote unquote, more resilient, right? I think that code speaks to a lot of businesses. Hey, let's think about what we do, what alternatives, what alternative plans. Right. We should put in place if we have to move and pivot out of China quickly.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah, yeah. And then Covid happened. And that, I think, made us think even harder about uh, that.

Davin Chor: Was part and parcel of this. Yeah, exactly.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah, yeah. Um, one question I had, and I don't know if you want to opine on this, is, you know, whether, um, the Trump administration both, you know, the first administration and now are thinking about trade as kind of like a proxy for war between us and China. Is that like a fair assessment, do you think, or how do you see that?

Davin Chor: War is a very strong word, right? Uh, and, um, what's clear is that, you know, there's definitely a heightened atmosphere of geoeconomic competition, right? So it's, you know, we're used to hearing the term geopolitical, right? So that's about, you know, uh, big powers, you know, jockeying for influence, right. Uh, in terms of, of, of allies, uh, across different countries. Um, but the term geoeconomic competition, right, has increased in usage, uh, in the last 3 to 4 years. Um, so this is really about countries jockeying for influence, but in the economic sphere, right. I think that's a reality, uh, that that colors how, uh, the, the US administration right now thinks about trade policy. It certainly colors how China thinks about, uh, its policies as well. Um, and we're seeing it in the data. Right. There is this very intentional, policy driven decoupling between the US and China. And I don't see that turning around, uh, anytime soon.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Okay, okay. Uh, and do you think that, um, Trump would feel vindicated in kind of setting this whole thing in motion now? Or do you think he has reason to kind of question whether he should have done this?

Davin Chor: Well, that's a very reasonable question to ask. Um, you know, on the one hand, you know. The the very rapid, right, expansion of Chinese exports to the US and the US is increasing dependence on China at some point, you know, even absent a Trump administration, you know, one, one one could argue that at some point. Right. Um, some US administration would have rethought the wisdom of being overly dependent and overly reliant on China, and we might have seen a more quiet sort of softening, a more quiet reversal, if you will. Right. Uh, of, uh, uh, some attempts to diversify, uh, US imports. Um, so, you know, at some level, you could argue that, you know, this this helps to build a little bit more resilience in the system. Right? Um, but at the same time, too, I think there is an element of reality bites in all of this, which is that, um, the world is very, very interconnected now, and a lot of production chains are predicated on this ability to tap onto suppliers that are located around the world. Um, and to just try to wave a magic tariff wand and bring, uh, some of that manufacturing activity closer back to US shores. That's just not going to happen overnight. Right? Uh, um, um, and I think that that there's that element of reality that, you know, it's still going to be very, very hard. There are some things in which China has genuine comparative advantage, and maybe one of the few suppliers in the world. Uh, you know, we saw that recently with the example of, you know, specialized magnets and rare earths. Right. So, um, it it's it's it's it's a delicate. It's a delicate game. Right. And, um, unfortunately. Right. This this pattern of, uh, tariff threats and tariff escalation. Right. Uh, if you will, it's it it it's not clear. It sets the right, uh, approach to tackling these, these issues relative to a quieter, like, uh, more rules based system. Um, you know, which countries talked behind the scenes.

Kirk Kardashian (host): I know you're not a, uh, a predictor of of how the world's going to go, but, um, what do you think would kind of be reasonable to expect in the next five years as far as trade policy and how these patterns, uh, will play out?

Davin Chor: I think there's going to be a lot of uncertainty, especially with the way in which, you know, the second Trump administration appears to like to conduct, uh, trade policy. Right. Um, we sort of, um, threats of escalation and de-escalation and pulling back, you know, uh, so, so, you know, that that pattern, you know, it's going to be a rocky ride. And I think US companies are kind of buckled in and, and, uh, and sort of ready to, to, to absorb those hits as, and when they come and ride those waves, if you will. Um, for me, the more interesting question is, is what to expect, right. Um, perhaps looking a little bit further down the road beyond a second Trump administration. Right. What does all this imply for the conduct of trade policy and for supply chain activity even beyond that? Uh, and I think there the crucial question to ask, if you're a US business decision maker will be, you know, um, which trade policies and which tariffs. Right. Uh, do we foresee would outlast? Right. A second Trump administration and might, might have legs that endure beyond that.

Davin Chor: Um, and which ones won't? Right. Um, you know, uh, and that will be a key deciding factor in terms of trying to sort through and think through what longer term plans one could make. You know, if you were really thinking about reorganizing your supply chains, um, and there I'm unfortunately a little bit more pessimistic about, you know, in particular the US-China bilateral relationship. Uh, I think that there's definitely been some fairly permanent damage done there. I certainly don't expect there to be a rebound in trust or rebound in willingness to engage uh, on uh say, you know, bringing down tariffs uh, dramatically. Uh, it won't happen fast even if it does eventually happen. Uh, and so, you know, planning for a world in which US-China direct trade between the US, China is sort of fraught with, uh, trade barriers, um, I think that's a reality that a lot of companies, uh, would have to prepare for even beyond a second Trump administration. And if there's any sort of recovery or if there's any sort of, uh, reconciliation, if you will, uh, that's going to happen slowly.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it sounds like, uh, what's, uh, what's happened already is going to kind of stick around for a while, and, uh, we shouldn't expect any sort of turnaround.

Davin Chor: Yeah. And I think it would, it would kind of behoove, you know, business decision makers to prepare for that kind of a landscape. Right. So on the one hand, I mean, the positive is a recognition that perhaps. Right. You know, the world and the US have been too dependent on China, if you will. Um, but on the other hand, it does mean that thinking hard about what? Our alternative. Uh, global production arrangements or global supply chain arrangements, one has. Uh, that's going to become really crucial. Right. Whether it's, you know, uh, figuring out, um, whether or not to offshore to other trade partners. You know, that, uh, may be comparable to China in terms of costs, but, uh, you know, geopolitically, uh, a little bit more friendly to the US, uh, whether it may be thinking about what activities we might bring back to the to to US shores, um, or thinking very seriously about, you know, if we are going to continue to engage China in manufacturing. What aspects of the supply chain can be, you know, safely what stages of the supply chain we can safely perform there. There would not be that geopolitically sensitive.

Kirk Kardashian (host): I know you've done a lot of work on the political implications of trade. Um, when you have that lens on, uh, how do you think that the Trump administration's trade policy in this, uh, go around with, with, with Trump is going to impact politics in the US?

Davin Chor: Uh, that's a great question. Um, you know.

Kirk Kardashian (host): I don't know if you dare to, to, uh, predict that one.

Davin Chor: Um, so growing up, uh, and by which I mean, you know, when I was a relatively, you know, an undergraduate and a PhD student, uh, uh, the conventional wisdom that had sort of been drilled in me in terms of when looking at these issues and looking at the interaction between trade policy and US political outcomes has been that, uh, trade policy doesn't win you a US election. Right. It doesn't win you office if you're running for president. Uh, it's not the issue that will decide the day. Uh, but it could very well lose you the election.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah.

Davin Chor: Uh, if you're seen to be vulnerable on that front. Right. Uh, and, uh, I have a feeling that that conventional wisdom is still going to be pretty strong going forward, right? Um, you know, it's going to take a lot of courage, uh, for the future, you know, um, uh, politicians who are running for public office in the US to campaign on the basis of free trade. Right. Uh, even though there are benefits to free trade, we all sort of understand there are those gains from trade and trade can help create jobs in certain circumstances. Uh, but the losses somehow seem to, you know, the losses of, you know, manufacturing jobs and factories, you know, that have been offshored, you know, that those losses just seem to be particularly salient and a political poison if you try to fight that. So it's going to take a lot of courage. And I think one of the things that as an academic economist, I think about and have conversations with my colleagues about has been, you know, how do you turn the tide of public opinion on this? Right to so, you know, we we, we are the beneficiaries, if you will, of living in a world with a lot of free trade. We have a huge variety of global goods that we purchase and that we consume, many of which would be way more expensive, right, if we didn't have the opportunity to trade with other countries and import those goods.

Davin Chor: Right. Um, or if companies didn't have the opportunities to organize their supply chains in a truly global fashion. Um, and so we one of the real challenges for us as economists is how to communicate that better to the public, to recognize that there are tremendous trade offs here. Right. We are giving up a lot if we choose to implement these tariff policies. Um, and ultimately, these trade barriers may not be good for long term growth and the vibrancy of the US economy. If it means that, you know, US companies, uh, don't have as much, don't face as much competitive pressure as they otherwise would in a truly globalized world. And so those are deep questions. Uh, and, uh, it's not a particularly optimistic note, uh, to, to, to, to to end this conversation on, um, but I think, I think they can be deeply consequential, if you will. Right. For, uh, the economic livelihoods of, uh, people in this country. Right? Many for, for at least the 1 or 2 generations down the road.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Yeah, yeah.

Davin Chor: It may not, we may not feel the benefits, if you will, of trade immediately. But they definitely have a long term goal. They have the long term. You know, trade liberalization definitely has that long term potential to uplift a lot of livelihoods. Um, um, and, you know, I think the world as a whole. And the US too, is giving up a lot, right? Uh, through the use of trade barriers.

Kirk Kardashian (host): Well, I look forward to more research from you, Davin. Um, and we appreciate your time. Thanks so much.